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1. Why We Should Not Study Transnational Corporate Elites
With the growing internationalization of business during the second half of the
Twentieth century, critical scholars increasingly saw a development where the elites
who own and control corporations cease to be organized or divided along national
lines. Instead, they expect the formation of a “transnational capitalist class” [Burris
and Staples 2012, 324]. They predicted that the national identities of corporate elites
would be replaced by a common transnational identity with a shared sense of eco-
nomic interests and an enhanced capacity for unified political action [Robinson 2004;
Sklair 2001]. Robinson, for instance, holds in his Theory of Global Capitalism that the
dynamics that caused the formation of national capitalist classes, are now unfolding
on a transnational scale. After the hegemonic periods of respectively Holland, Britain
and the US,
the baton is being passed to an emerging transnational configuration [and] we are
witness to an emerging transnational hegemony in a process that is contested and
far from finished, the emergence of a new historic block that is global in scope and
based on the hegemony of transnational capital [Robinson 2004, 77].
Robinson expects that the main contradictions that emerge in the process of
globalization will be between the nationally oriented bourgeoisie and the elites that
have an interest beyond the nation states boundaries.
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Unfortunately, much of the literature on the emergence of a transnational capi-
talist class drew on a mixture of anecdotal evidence and theoretically informed spec-
ulation, as is rightly pointed out by Burris and Staples [2012, 324]. Notable excep-
tions exist however. Fennema [1982], for instance, was the first to empirically ana-
lyze the transnational network of interlocking directorates directors that sit on the
boards of two companies and thus form a connection between the two firms. He
found that by 1970 there was an Atlantic component of interlocking directorates,
which had national clusters connected by international interlocks. By 1976 this net-
work had become much more transnational; the number of international interlocks
in the Atlantic component had increased by 50 percent. However, the transnational
network of board interlocks was primarily established between neighboring countries
in Europe, crossed to a lesser extent the Atlantic, and hardly connected upcoming
economic regions in Asia or the rest of the world [Ibidem]. Board interlocks proved a
helpful element in the empirical studies on social corporate elite organization. Schol-
ars have argued that board interlocks serve to reduce economic uncertainty and se-
cure resources from banks and suppliers. Others see them as a mean to maintain class
cohesion [Mills 1956; Zeitlin 1974], integrate new elites and facilitate class-wide po-
litical action [Domhoff 1970]. Other perspectives hold that board interlocks together
form a communication system and provide a “business scan” [Useem 1984] allowing
for the spread of business strategies and information about (future) economic trends
and challenges.1 Of course, we should not reduce the entire (transnational) corporate
elite community (and its various sources of integration) to the practice of interlocking
corporate directorships. For sure, there are many key actors in the business commu-
nity outside the set of corporate board members, such as lawyers, accountants, but
also fund managers and perhaps even regulators. Yet, whatever their purpose, board
interlocks are present in practically every country and, as such, are studied being a
meaningful indicator of elite social organization [David and Westerhuis 2014; Scott
1991].
Most empirical work on business elite networks in the Twentieth century looked
exclusively at connections within particular countries. The transnational corporate
elite was debated and theorized, but, aside from the work of Fennema [1982] and
Fennema and Schijf [1985], empirical research remained scarce. In the Twenty- first
century, however, increased attention was paid to the transnational network. A fol-
low up study on the pioneering work of Fennema [1982] by Carroll and Fennema
[2002] on the transnational network found that twenty years after 1976, the transna-
tional network of interlocking directorates remained remarkably stable. Although it
x
1  See Davis and Greve [1997], or Mizruchi [1996] for a review.
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was coined the age of globalization, by the mid-1990s the network of transnational
corporate elites still comprised mainly corporate directors and executives from the
leading capitalist countries in North America and Europe.2 In the early years of the
Twenty-first century, things start to change. By the mid-2000s the top of the transna-
tional network also connected to elites in countries such as India, Mexico, Singa-
pore, Turkey, Brazil and China, leading Carroll et al. [2010a, 233] to conclude that
a transnational capitalist class was “in the making, but not (yet) made.” Most recent
empirical work underscores the resilience of the transnational network in the wake
of the decline of national network cohesion and point at the increasing relevance of
these transnational ties [Heemskerk et al. 2016]. A transnational corporate elite may
have finally arrived.
A consistent but often overlooked finding is that the increase in transnational
corporate networks typically does not connect far away regions in the world, but
rather integrates business elites that are relatively nearby, such as in Europe, or North
America [Carroll et al. 2010a and 2010b; Fennema and Schijf 1985]. And this may
have important repercussions for those who expect a transnational corporate elite
identity to emerge. After all it is fair to say that a board interlock between a German
and a Dutch, an USA and a Canadian, or a Venezuelan and a Colombian firm is
qualitatively different from ties that span different regions of the globe, and connect
for instance firms in the USA with China, Spain with India, or Italy with Brazil.
This begs the question whether these nearby ties, although they connect the boards
of firms domiciled in different countries, are indeed the building blocks of global
elite networks. This question is part of the more general problem of theoretical and
methodological nationalism. Theoretically, “transnational” is always defined in rela-
tion to the “national.” Empirically, we often only have data available that allows us to
study and compare network patterns between countries. If our theoretical concepts
are based on countries, and our empirical data is organized in countries, it may come
as no surprise that we find that countries are important. For the literature on corpo-
rate elites this distinction in national and international has led to the search for elite
networks that stand free from national business communities as a hallmark sign for
the transnational corporate elite. But by assuming that global corporate elites emerge
when they transcend national borders, one fails to acknowledge that corporate elite
networks are often delineated by boundaries that not necessarily coincide with that of
the nation state. Historical, cultural, geographical and political factors determine how
and where the global corporate elites are organizing and whether the nation state is
a meaningful spatial category to depart from. We should therefore make an effort to
x
2  See also Kentor and Jang [2004].
Heemskerk, Takes, Garcia-Bernardo and Huijzer, Where is the Global Corporate Elite?
4
develop theoretical and empirical approaches that leave behind the a priori focus on
the nation state as the most relevant spatial category for corporate elite organization.
2. Local and Nonlocal Corporate Elite Networks
2.1. The Reorganization of the Local
In order to accommodate our effort to come up with an approach that does
not container corporate networks a priori within the boundaries of the nation state,
we turn to Kono et al. [1998], who introduced the useful distinction between local
and nonlocal ties. This distinction is helpful because it allows the analysis of the
structure of networks of interlocking directorates without presupposing that the na-
tion state is the most important level of elite organization. The dominant approach
in the contemporary literature is to think about national corporate elite networks
as the local, and consider transnational ties that cross national borders as the nonlo-
cal. But the increase in corporate elite network cohesion across Europe mentioned
above points at alternative reading: it may well be the case that what is local for cor-
porate elites is what is changing. And this would not be the first time either. From
detailed country studies, we know that in the first half of the Twentieth century,
corporate elites where typically organized around cities [Dooley 1969; Levine 1972;
Allen 1978]. In the USA, the Boston banking elite was different from the one in
New York [Pak 2013; Mizruchi 2013]. Even in a small country as the Netherlands,
the pre-World War II corporate elite was organized in the distinct elite communi-
ties of Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague (with ties to the Dutch colonies) and
the textile industry around Enschede [Heemskerk 2007]. There is ample evidence
of how these local elites organized their cohesion through upper class social inter-
actions.
Drawing on urban growth machine theory of Molotch [1976], Kono et al.
[1998] argue that well into the Twentieth century, the growth and business opportu-
nities of most firms were predominantly a local affair, which required effective coor-
dination by public and private actors within cities. To achieve this, corporate elites
and state officials knit together in local growth coalitions in order to shape public
policy that fosters local growth and as such advance their interests. If successful,
some of the larger firms were able to expand their activities beyond the local growth
coalition. This led to nonlocal ties between cities; sometimes in the same country,
sometimes crossing national borders as well. According to Kono et al. [1998], local
ties and nonlocal ties are differently motivated and established by different sorts of
firms. Firms that depend on local growth interlock primarily with local firms. Con-
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versely, firms with suppliers and production outside the local region are more likely
to interlock with geographically more distant firms.
This organization of elite cohesion at the local city level changed over the course
of the Twentieth century when corporate elites gradually integrated with other es-
tablished networks within the boundaries of the nation state. In the second half of
the Twentieth century we see how these separate local elite communities that were
primarily centered around particular cities, gradually merge together in national cor-
porate elites. This transformation is perhaps best exemplified in the mergers of banks
that used to serve the interest of regional business communities and in the emergence
of national networks of interlocking directorates [Heemskerk 2007; Mizruchi 2013;
David and Westerhuis 2014]. What was considered as local for the business elite
changed, and with it their networks changed as well. By the last quarter of the Twen-
tieth century, social organization of corporate elites at the local level meant in most
areas in the world social organization at the national level.
And with the change of the local, the nonlocal changed as well. The oil crisis in
the 1970s prompted the now national corporate elites to invest in new nonlocal (and
hence transnational) ties with corporations outside of their national business com-
munities (as pointed about above). And in line with the expectations of Kono et al.
[1998], firms that engaged in these nonlocal transnational interlocking were typically
production firms with a global reach, such as the globally operating oil companies
(Shell, BP, Gulf Oil and Imperial Oil), car producers (Ford, FIAT, General Motors)
and steel firms (Rio Tinto, British Steel) [Heemskerk et al. 2016].
The local, thus, varies in scope over time and space. In this article, we do not
hold a predefined conception of what is local and what is nonlocal, as we accept that
what is local may differ across various areas of the world. That business communities
knit together and reconfigure the local in one place, does not mean that the same
processes are taking place elsewhere. That some subnational business communities
transformed into national business communities does not mean that all business com-
munities became national in scope, nor that this transformation always took place
along national borders. Consequently, we maintain that what is local is to be inferred
from the empirical, rather than forced upon the empirical.
2.2. What is Local in a Globalized World?
There are good reasons to expect that for the contemporary corporate elite,
again a reconfiguration of the local is taking place in many areas in the world. At least
three empirical observations point into this direction. First, as mentioned above, the
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increase in transnational board interlocks in the Twenty-first century [Carroll and
Fennema 2002; Kentor and Jang 2004]. Here it is important to mention that transna-
tional interlocking predominantly takes place within certain regions such as Europe
and North America. Second, while transnational board interlocks used to be created
by a small elite group of corporate directors, it has now become much more common
practice among corporate elites. A study of the European network of board interlocks
in 2005 and 2010 showed that the hard core of European corporate directors who
created at least four Pan-European interlocks remains stable in size (respectively 16
and 17 directors), but their contributions to the overall network density drops from
46 percent in 2005 to 25 percent by 2010 [Heemskerk et al. 2013, 92]. In similar vein,
for the global network of board interlocks between a group of top 176 global firms
we see that the contributions of the big linkers (at least four positions) drops from
31% in 1976 to 20% in 2006 and 12% by 2013. The role of single linkers, directors
with two positions, increases at the same time from 45% in 1976 to 57% by 2013
[Heemskerk et al. 2016, 78]. This suggests that it becomes more common for corpo-
rate directors to engage in transnational board interlocks, and that the transnational
network is no longer the domain of a few super connectors. Third, a recent study of
the global network of interlocking directorates among the largest one million firms
in the world showed that although we see increasing density of the European corpo-
rate network over the past decades, the underlying network structure remains in fact
very regionalized. Because this study was not restricted to the top 300 or 500 largest
firms it provided a much more fine-grained perspective on the social structure of
Europe’s corporate elite. Where Carroll and Fennema [2002] concluded that by 1996
the transnational corporate elite network was still best described as a superstructure
that rested upon rather resilient national bases, Heemskerk and Takes find a
multilevel structure where, in between the national and the transnational, discern-
ible regional clusters play a fundamental role in the network architecture [2016,
112].
In what follows we study the patterns of local and nonlocal corporate elite orga-
nization. In today’s world, what is considered local may very well cross national bor-
ders. And conversely, there may be nonlocal ties within one country as well. Imagine
emerging markets, where some parts of the business elite try to integrate with the
western elites and others are more oriented to their respective states. The truly global
part of the corporate elite network is that which connects across business communi-
ties, disregarding its geographic position or scope. This raises the question of how
to distinguish between local and nonlocal ties, without using a geographic definition
such as national vs. international. In what follows we use a network analysis approach
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of community detection as a means of locating local and nonlocal ties based on the
properties of the network structure itself.
3. A Large-scale Network Analytic Approach to Spatial Elite
Organization
3.1. Community Detection
From a network perspective, communities are groups of nodes that share more
connections with each other than with others outside the community. Communities
are dense interconnected pockets of a network, where its members have a high degree
of interconnectedness. We can define local ties as the set of ties that connect nodes
that are all a member of the same community. Local ties are intra-community ties,
regardless of whether this community is bounded by subnational, national or regional
boundaries. And in similar vein, ties that connect points across different communities
can be designated as nonlocal ties. Following this approach of local and nonlocal we
do not assume that geographic distance or political dividing lines such as national
borders are crucial for the formation of communities. But at the same time we do
not preclude it either. This approach allows us to make the extent to which the
corporate elite is organized along national borders an empirical question. It also
allows for diversity in the (multi-level) organization of corporate elites from place
to place. The local business community may at some places be a network centered
around a particular city, whereas in other regions it is centered around a country or
a transnational region. Hence, we reveal the geographic organization of the global
corporate elite, and to do so we do not start with a geographically informed notion
of local and nonlocal.
Previous studies typically focused on the networks of board interlocks between
a few hundred of the largest corporations. Here we take a different approach and
study a database that covers millions of firms across the globe. The benefit of this
approach is that it releases us from the need to look at the most likely places of
elite integration, and actually study the entire universe of interlocking directorates.
In our analysis we study the network of board interlocks between a set of over five
million connected firms across the globe. As we are interested in the geographic
organization of the corporate elite, we consider the city locations of the head offices
of all firms. This allows us to study how these locations are clustered in communities
and which cities play a more or less important role in the creation of the nonlocal
network ties. Yet, studying this number of board interlocks without delimiting our
sample to a predetermined subset of firms also raises a question on whether all ties
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under study can be considered as elite-ties. A board interlock between two large
firms whose operations span the globe supposedly serves different purposes than
a tie between two small private firms connecting two nearby cities. From a global
perspective, the latter tie can hardly be regarded an elite tie, while at a lower level of
analysis the tie may still reinvigorate local growth coalitions. Rather than identifying
the different characteristics of various corporate elite ties, our effort consists of an
attempt to geographically locate the ties that span current local growth coalitions and
are therefore most likely to accommodate global or regional elite integration. Since
this is the first time the global network of board interlocks has been studied in this
scope we first describe and analyze its overall structure before we distill pattern of
communities. Subsequently we investigate which cities are central in spanning the
networks within and between communities.
3.2. Methods
To better understand our board interlock network, we use social network analy-
sis techniques. First, we are interested in finding communities, a process commonly
referred to as community detection. We choose to do so using modularity maximiza-
tion. Modularity is a measure that indicates the quality of a division of the entire net-
work into non-overlapping communities. A higher modularity value means that over
the entire network, there are more connections between nodes in the same cluster
than between nodes in different communities. Because the problem of finding the
best division of a network into communities is NP-complete, community detection
algorithms try to maximize the modularity value using heuristics and approximations.
We use the common Louvain method [Blondel et al. 2008]. To assess the stability
of the communities we find, we compared the results with some other modularity
maximization algorithms that maximize the value using randomized methods. We
observed no notable differences, apart from small artifacts of randomization.
Second, centrality measures allow nodes to be ranked based on their structural
position in the network. We use degree, eccentricity and betweenness centrality. The
degree centrality measure determines for each node a centrality value based on the
degree (number of connections) of that node, where a node with a higher number of
connections is assumed to be more central. Degree centrality only considers the local
neighborhood of a city as it counts the number of direct connections. It does not
consider how a city is positioned in the network at large, for instance if it is in the core
or in the periphery of the network. For this we turn to the second centrality measure,
eccentricity. For each node in a network, eccentricity considers the shortest paths
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to all other nodes in that network. The longest of such paths gives the eccentricity
score. For example, city that has an eccentricity of five can reach all other cities in
at most five steps [Takes and Kosters 2013]. Third, betweenness centrality considers
a node to be more central if it is part of a relatively larger number of shortest paths
between all other node pairs, i.e. if it is a bridge between communities [Brandes
2008].
3.3. Data
The data source is the ORBIS database of Bureau van Dijk. This database con-
tains information on over 200 million private and public companies across the globe.
The ORBIS database has frequently been identified as one of the best sources of
information for research on corporate networks [Vitali et al. 2011; Compston 2013].
At the same time, we need to take into account the limitations of this data as well.
It is sourced from various local information providers (such as national registers and
chambers of commerce), and the quality of the data does differ with a bias towards
better quality for richer countries. An exception to this trend is North America, whose
data quality is moderate. Thus, our results may be downplaying the role of the United
States in the global network For a more elaborate discussion on the quality of the
ORBIS data, see Heemskerk and Takes [2016]. Notably, we do not limit ourselves
to listed firms as that would exclude large parts of the economy. In this we follow
common approach in the literature on global corporate board networks.
In selecting the firms and directors to construct the board interlock network,
we proceeded as follows. In September 2015, we selected from the database all firms
listed as “active” for which data on positions was available. For each firm, we acquired
data on its positions, selecting only those positions listed as “current” and held by
actual persons (and thus not by firms). We only selected positions listed as being
the chief executive officer, highest executive, supervisory board, executive board,
board of directors or member of a committee. This results in a set of 18,211,838
firms where 8,090,796 senior level directors hold positions such that an interlock is
created between two firms. The cities of these firms are divided over countries as
shown in Figure 1.
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FIG. 1. Division of cities over countries
Source: Authors’ elaboration
An increasingly important problem when studying board interlock networks
has to do with rise in complex administrative holding structures that firms create
for fiscal and legal purposes. In the myriad of legal entities that together constitute
a firm or bank, it becomes very difficult to pinpoint what the proper delineation of
the firm is, and which board we should consider in our analysis. Shell companies and
brass plate companies in tax havens only add to this confusion. As a result, there is
a fair share of board interlocks in the network that are administrative ties that exist
on paper only, rather than social ties where people actually meet and participate in
meaningful board conversation and decision making. It is difficult to filter out these
different types of ties [Heemskerk and Takes 2016]. Here we have chosen a practical
and effective approach to diminish the distorting effect of administrative ties. We
eliminate the interlock ties that go hand in hand with an ownership relation of more
than 50% (as registered in ORBIS), as this is then likely a parent-subsidiary or holding
structure. Similarly, we ignored directors with more than 100 positions, because it is
unlikely that such a person facilitates “real” interlocks.
The information on board positions is essentially a two-mode network of firms
and officers linked through positions. From this we constructed a one-mode network
in which the nodes represent firms and weighted edges represent shared senior level
directors. The edge weight denotes the number of shared directors between the two
firms the edge connects. In this firm-by-firm network, not all firms are connected to
each other. In particular, the network contains multiple connected components. As
is typical for these networks, there is one giant component. These 5,262,534 firms
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capture the majority of the interlocks. The second largest component in terms of
size contains only 339 firms, and in fact 95% of the smaller components are of size
smaller than 20. The majority of economic activity is captured by the giant com-
ponent, and for the remainder of this paper we will therefore focus on this com-
ponent.
So, we end up with a network of over 5.2 million firms that are connected by
about 37 million board interlocks (the largest connected component in the network).
For our analysis we consider the board interlocks between cities. To do so, we aggre-
gate all firms that are domiciled in the same city in one node, and connect city nodes
by means of a weighted edge indicating the number of interlocks between firms in
these cities. Appendix A gives detailed information on how we aggregated the firms
in city clusters.
4. Empirical Results
4.1. Network Topology
We study the network of 24,747 cities, connected through 874,810 distinct ties
(which together carry the 37 million board interlocks). Because the network is an
aggregation of the connected component of the underlying firm-by-firm network, all
cities are connected in one component as well. On average, each city is connected
to 71 other cities.
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FIG. 2. Degree distribution of the city network
Source: Authors’ elaboration
However, as displayed by Figure 2, there is a significant difference in the degree
of connectivity of cities. A sizable group of cities have board interlock connections
to no more than ten other cities, while a relatively small number of cities are super
connectors, reaching out to over a 1,000 other cities. This power-law distribution
signals the scale-free property of the network.
How globally connected is the corporate elite? The average distance measures
the average number of steps to be traversed to get from one node to another node. It
turns out that cities in the global network of interlocking directorates are intercon-
nected with an average distance of only 2.83.
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FIG. 3. Distance distribution of the city network
Source: Authors’ elaboration
The distribution of average distances shown in Figure 3 indicates that the global
city network is relatively well connected through interlocking directorates; it is indeed
a small- world network [Kleinberg 2000]. A next step is to consider those cities that
are most central in this global city network.
TAB. 1 Eccentricity distribution of the city network
Eccentricity value 4 5 6 7
Frequency 409 20782 3519 37
Source: Authors’ Elaboration
Table 1 shows the distribution of the eccentricity values. On the rightmost end
of the eccentricity spectrum there are the cities that are least well connected. The
largest eccentricity score is 7, meaning that those cities are 7 steps away of at least one
other city in the network. We can say these cities form the periphery. There are only
37 nodes in this periphery, which upon manual inspection appears to mainly consist
of smaller businesses in rural areas of Russia and the United States. More interesting
in Table 1 is the lowest value of eccentricity in the network. This value is called the
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radius, and the set of nodes with an eccentricity value equal to this radius are in the
center of the network. The cities in the center of the network have an eccentricity
of 4, meaning that they can reach all other cities in at most four steps. This group
consists of 409 cities: 1.65% of the nodes in the city network.
FIG. 4. Visualization of the center (eccentricity value 4) of the city network
Source: Authors’ elaboration
Figure 4 shows the network between this set of central cities. For visibility
reasons, we have chosen to only show edges when two cities are connected by more
than 20 board interlocks. One observation clearly stands out: London is right in the
center of this group of central cities. It is the most central city in the global board
interlock network by both degree and betweenness measures (see Table 2).
It is followed by high degree centrality cities Paris, Madrid, Brussels, Milano,
Luxembourg and Barcelona. Sao Paulo and Moscow score among the top five cities
ranked by betweenness centrality, since they connect their emerging markets to the
global corporate network. Cities in the United Kingdom are well connected as well,
not only to other UK cities but also abroad. In fact, UK cities connect more to cities
abroad than within the UK. This effect is largely driven by London, which is extra-
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ordinary well connected. This overrepresentation of international city ties is typically
a feature of small countries where businesses are concentrated in a few cities, such as
Belgium, Switzerland and Austria. A final observation is that although there is a fair
share of USA cities in this central core, they form somewhat of a peripheral cluster,
primarily connected to the rest of the world through New York, Washington and Los
Angeles. However, low data quality in the USA may downplay its role in the global
network (see section 3.2).
TAB. 2 Top-25 most central cities in the city network
Degree centrality Betweenness centrality
London London
Paris Sao Paulo
Madrid Paris
Bruxelles Madrid
Milano Moscow
Luxembourg Melbourne
Barcelona Sydney
Wien Bruxelles
Amsterdam Wien
Dublin Barcelona
Oslo Helsinki
Helsinki Milano
Sydney Oslo
Zurich Bogota
Kobenhavn Luxembourg
Melbourne Rio De Janeiro
Hamburg New Delhi
Auckland Budapest
Stockholm Auckland
Zug Amsterdam
Berlin Sofia
Muenchen Washington
New Delhi Praha
Frankfurt Stockholm
Praha Bucureshti
Source: Authors’ Elaboration
4.2. Local Communities in the Global Corporate Elite
Now we turn to the key objective of this paper and distinguish between local
and nonlocal network ties. As explained above, we use the method of community de-
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tection and define the ties within communities as local, and those between commu-
nities as nonlocal. When we apply the Louvain modularity maximization method for
community detection at the default resolution, all cities in the network are grouped
in 14 separate communities. This division in communities has a modularity value of
0.83. Previous work has studied in depth how the community structure of global
networks of interlocks is hierarchically nested [Heemskerk and Takes 2016]. Here
we choose to study the division in communities that generates the highest modularity
value, that is, the partitioning in communities that optimizes the rule that nodes are
better connected within a community than between communities.
A fair share of the board interlocks occurs between firms within cities. This
means that in the network, there are self-loops which “connect” cities with them-
selves. Some of these self-loops have considerable weight. If we include these self-
loops when applying community detection, the communities we find are slightly bi-
ased towards different countries’ capitals, and fewer communities appear. London
has an extraordinary strong self-loop. If self-loops are taken into account when ap-
plying community detection, London is considered as a separate community. With-
out the integrative power of London the rest of the British business community falls
apart in 19 separate additional communities.
The cities in the UK in general and London in particular stand out in this
respect. From the analysis with self-loops one can cautiously infer that the corpo-
rate communities are more sub-nationally structured than along national boundaries.
Here we choose to exclude the self-loops for the community detection analysis be-
cause the large increase in communities makes our analysis of inter-community ties
more difficult to interpret. Because of the hierarchically nested community struc-
ture, we do not throw away information but rather analyze the network at a high-
er level of aggregation. Figure 5 illustrates this by comparing how the communi-
ties with and without self-loops are hierarchically nested. The most leftward col-
umn shows for instance that the 20 separate British communities that are generat-
ed with self-loops are all part of the British community in the analysis without self-
loops.
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FIG. 5. Nested structure of communities with and without city self-loops
Source: Authors’ elaboration
Figure 6 gives a representation of the spatial distribution of the community
structure. The nodes are cities, positioned in space based on their longitude and lat-
itude. Cities in the same community have the same color. There are a number of
observations. First of all, we see that this color-coding of the communities clearly
highlights particular countries. Portugal is clearly separated from Spain on the Iberi-
an Peninsula (but in the same community as Brazil), the United Kingdom (and Ire-
land) stands out, as do South Africa and Finland. Note that the community detection
algorithm only considered board interlocks between firms in cities and did not have
any information on nationality. Nonetheless, the results show that national borders
do still play a role for the organization of business elites. Second, at the same time
there are communities that bring together firms and cities from neighboring regions
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and countries. In Europe we see a southwestern and a central European community,
and in Asia there are two communities as well. A closer look reveals that countries
from the former British Empire are still relatively close and therefore grouped in
one community: India, Australia and New Zealand. South Korea and Vietnam also
belong to this group.
FIG. 6. Community structure of the global network of interlocking directorates
Source: Authors’ elaboration
Figure 7 zooms in on Europe and gives a more detailed insight in the spatial
level of corporate elite organization. The European corporate network clearly sep-
arates in distinct regional communities, but a visual inspection already shows that
national borders still play an important role. Interestingly, some of the communi-
ties reflect geo-political structures now long gone. One business community follows
the boundaries of Czechoslovakia; another resembles the original early Nineteenth
century Kingdom of the Netherlands (the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg).
Among the Nordic countries, Finland separates from Scandinavia. Another interest-
ing observation is that Poland is very divided. Poland seems to lack a cohesive busi-
ness community as the German (or Central European) business community perme-
ates Poland within the Nineteenth century German and Prussian borders. These ob-
servations suggest that the level of cohesion among business elites differs significantly
across Europe.
Sociologica, 2/2016
19
FIG. 7. Community structure of the European part of the network
Source: Authors’ elaboration
For each community we can zoom in on the nationality of the cities that are
part of the clusters (see Figure 8). The smallest communities are the ones around
South Africa, the Czech and Slovak republics, and The Netherlands and Belgium.
The Russian corporate elite is organized in a separate community, and Russian cities
are absent from the other communities (with only a handful exceptions). This is
in line with the high betweenness centrality of Moscow, reported above. Moscow
connects the distinct Russian community to the rest of the world. Bulgarian and Ro-
manian corporate elites dominate a South East European community, that extends
south to regions in Turkey, Greece and Egypt. China and Japan together dominate
the East Asian community, while Australia and India are the dominant countries in
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the more diverse and larger Asian community. This community also includes a num-
ber of North American as well as European cities. In Northern Europe, the Baltic
countries are divided over the Scandinavian community (Latvia and Lithuania) and a
Finnish one (Estonia). The latter reflects the deep cultural and language similarities.
In a way the UK-USA cluster may reflect language and cultural similarities as well,
although within the USA there is a division between locations oriented on the Anglo-
American community; the Commonwealth Asian community, and a North American
community. This North American community includes Israel as well, reflecting long
standing political and social ties. Language similarity is also evident in the Brazilian-
Portuguese community. Finally, there are two very large and internationally diverse
communities in Europe. One is centered around Germany and extends south to the
Alpine countries and east to Hungary, Croatia and parts of Poland. The largest com-
munity contains the business elites of the largest Southern European countries on the
continent: Spain, France, and Italy.
FIG. 8. National diversity of community composition
Source: Authors’ elaboration
Reviewing the national composition of the communities, we need to conclude
that there is considerable diversity. Some communities single out a particular busi-
ness elite, such as the Russian one. Some bring together business elites from cultur-
ally similar regions, such as the transatlantic community; Scandinavia, and Portugal-
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Brazil. Other communities however are more diverse in its composition and suggest
a level of corporate elite organization that goes across national borders.
4.3. The Nonlocal Network Ties
The lion share of the board interlocks connect firms and cities that fall within
the same community. If we only consider the binary network where cities are either
connected or disconnected, 67 percent of all the connections are local and 33 percent
nonlocal. If we count all board interlocks between cities (the weighted network), an
impressive 92 percent of the network resides within the communities. Note that this
is also reflected by the high modularity value. At the same time, the 8% of nonlocal
ties contain no less than 2.84 million board interlocks. These nonlocal interlocks
connect the communities, and Figure 9 shows what the global network looks like if
we aggregate to the level of communities.
FIG. 9. Community by community network
Source: Authors’ elaboration
To ease the interpretation, the position of the nodes is related to their geograph-
ic position vis-a-vis each other. As we can expect, the network is fully connected. But
some communities are better connected than others, as reflected by the thickness of
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the tie in Figure 9. The strongest tie connects South West Europe with Central Eu-
rope. This is, indeed, the German-Franco axis that is so fundamental to the process
of European integration. At the same time, there still is a clear separation between
a French and German corporate sphere of influence. One may say that when the
time comes that the German and French business elites are no longer distinct com-
munities but part of the same community, the project of European Unification has
come to the next level. Both the central and southwestern European communities
are well connected with the Anglo-American community, with London as hub. The
Commonwealth label of one of the communities seems justified given the strong tie
it has with Anglo-America, in fact through the strong ties with London.
We already saw that London plays a key role in connecting business elites across
the globe, and this remains the case when we consider the cities that are most impor-
tant in spanning the global network of nonlocal corporate ties. Figure 10 singles out
the network between the most central cities in the network of nonlocal ties, that is
the group of cities that connect to at least 1,000 cities in other communities.
FIG. 10. Nonlocal network between the main networked cities
Source: Authors’ elaboration
Given the relatively high density of ties in Europe and the larger number of
European communities, it is to be expected to see a large number of European cities
among this hard core. In Europe, the capital cities (Madrid, Paris, Berlin, Amsterdam,
Brussels, Copenhagen and so on) are all part of the core as the network. We also
see that major transportation hubs such as airports and harbors bring together the
transnational corporate elite (Schiphol, Zaventem, Antwerpen, Rotterdam). Valetta,
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in south Europe, is the capital city of Malta. In Asia, it is noticeable that a number
of Indian cities are part of the hard core of the network. Hong Kong singles out as a
hub in Asia, reaching out to all other parts of the network. In Africa, Johannesburg
remains well connected with a noticeable strong tie to London, as many other cities
have as well. Interestingly, New York is the only USA city among this key group in the
network in Figure 10. New York is the bridgehead of the USA to the rest of the world.
5. Conclusion and Discussion
We argued that in order to advance our understanding of the organization of
corporate elites, we must not force the distinction between national and transnational
upon the analysis. Business elites reconfigure their networks, from the city level, to
the national level, and beyond. Here we asked what the current level of organization
is. In order to develop an answer to this question we studied the worldwide network
of interlocking directorates of over 5 million firms. We did so without assuming that
the main distinction between corporate elites is that of the national – transnational
level. Building on the theoretical distinction between local and nonlocal ties we used
network analysis and in particular community detection to understand how corporate
elites are organized in distinct business communities, and where and how these busi-
ness communities are subsequently interconnected. Our large-scale network analysis
rendered a number of insights.
First of all, national borders still play an important role for the organization of
corporate elites. The community structure we uncovered shows that national borders
still form cleavages for corporate elites. The community structure also echoes state
delineations long gone, such as Czechoslovakia and the original Kingdom of the
Netherlands, and also in part the mixture of communities in Poland that are partly
structured along the old German border. Communities also reflect language and
ethnic connections, for instance between Estonia and Finland or Portugal and Brazil.
Second, we also find that what is local for the business elite is indeed changing from
the national to the transnational plane. However, we see considerable heterogeneity in
the level of elite organization across different regions in the world. In Russia, the local
business community coincides with the state boundaries. In the USA in contrast we
find three spheres of influence: one North American (including Israel) community,
one community oriented towards Asia and one community oriented towards Europe,
most prominently London. In this paper we only studied a snapshot image of the
global network of interlocking directorates. A longitudinal study with similar setup
could trace how these communities develop over time. In the case of the USA, this
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would render unique opportunities, for instance to study if the pivot to Asia in the
USA foreign policy is also reflected in the orientation of the business elite. And, if it
does, we can ask whether the business elite networks foreshadow the foreign policy
change or follow its lead. Third, we found that the city hubs in the networks are
very different in nature. London is the most central city in the network of the global
corporate elite. The status of London within its community and the network as a
whole is unmatched by any other city.
When analyzing trans-community or nonlocal networks, rather than transna-
tional ones, we find that outside Europe, connections are primarily regional in nature
and that the networks do not reach out much to the rest of the world. If the true “glob-
al corporate elites” are the ones that transcend their mostly regionally structured local
business communities, then they can mainly be found in Europe or in the hubs that
are well connected to London (often located in commonwealth territory). Beside the
relatively low representation of North American cities, cities in China, Japan and Rus-
sia do not reach out much outside their local communities at all. This sheds light on
how the transnational or global elite is socially configured and whether we will indeed
witness the emergence of a truly “global corporate elite” or “global capitalist class.”
Despite claims on increasing interdependence of various economic regions in the
world, corporate elites from Asia, Latin-America and even North-America, are not
yet fully integrated in the corporate elite network that transcend local communities.
In sum, it seems warranted to conclude that our approach to study local and
nonlocal corporate elite ties is a fruitful endeavor. We hope that our work shows that
it is important to include space in the study of corporate elites. In studies on corporate
elites, space has long been implicitly considered as a natural stage upon which social
action unfolds [Friedland and Palmer 1994]. Although there existed some notions of
spatiality in studies of corporate elites (see for instance Dooley [1969]; Levine [1972];
Allen [1978]; Mizruchi [1982]; Mintz and Schwartz [1985]), geographic proximity of
inter-firm relations was mostly regarded to be something unsocial. Following Fried-
land and Palmer [1994] and Kono et al. [1998], we prefer to view space as a socially
formed determinant, medium and outcome of social structure. Our approach shows
that it is elementary, possible and helpful to study space without forcing a certain
spatial category such as states upon the analysis.
At the same time, we recognize that our study is limited in a number of ways.
Here we considered board interlocks as a telltale sign of elite organization. In the
introduction we already pointed out that we believe this is an expedient, but neces-
sarily limited approach for studying corporate elites. For one, it leaves out key actors
outside the boardroom such as lawyers, accountants, but also investors and fund
managers who arguable have an increasing role in todays financialized capitalism. We
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therefore do not want to claim that we have now investigated the corporate elite in
its fullest extent. Another limitation is a direct result of the large scale of our analy-
sis. Although the scale allows us to engage in a fine grained analysis of worldwide
patterns of elite organization, it does so at the expense of a detailed understanding
of its constituting individual components: the firms and directors. Our analysis is in
that sense disconnected from the logics and interests that drive the formation of the
networks that we study at the level of the actors out of which it is composed. And
to make matters more complicated, we know that these logics and interests differ
across different regions in the world. Board interlocks have a different meaning and
function for firms in Asia, Latin America, or Europe. We do see very promising de-
velopments however in the area of modelling network dynamics (agent based and
exponential random graph models) that may make it possible in the near future to
comparatively study the generating mechanisms of board interlocks in the different
communities that we uncovered. Finally, the large scale also means that we cannot
be as confident about the quality of our data as we can when we manually collect
samples. For instance, the low weight of the USA in the network may be due to lower
data quality (3.2). This is an important concern, and with the increase of large scale
corporate network studies we must devote more attention towards the development
of tools and techniques to gauge and improve data quality.
An important benefit from our approach is that it allows for, and indeed uncov-
ered, different levels of elite organization in different areas of the world. The com-
munity detection approach also allows for more fine-grained and detailed studies,
in at least two ways. First, we can continue and investigate the particularities of the
network structure within communities. How are the different communities in their
topological properties? And how does this relate to our theoretical understanding
of elite formation in these regions? Second, as explained in the methods section, we
can further dissect the community structure and investigate the hierarchically nested
structure. We now have the data available, necessary to conduct such fine grained
analysis. We see this as a promising way forward for understanding the multilevel
structure of elite organization as pointed out in Heemskerk and Takes [2016]. This
brings us to a final and related shortcoming of our study. We argue against the nation-
al-international dichotomy in the study of corporate elites. And while our approach
breaks free from theoretical and methodological nationalism, our suggested dichoto-
my of local and nonlocal leaves only little room for a proper analysis of the multi-level
structure we encountered. Follow up work must make an effort to develop a more
multi-level or nested approach of social organization of corporate elites.
We believe our approach also presents a promising avenue for developing an
answer to a key question in global politics, international relations, and economic so-
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ciology today: do we see a relatively cohesive transnational corporate power elite or
are there in fact factions with irreconcilable differences among such a transnational
corporate elite? The distinction between local and nonlocal corporate elite networks
allows us to reinvigorate the classic debate on elite power between elitists and plu-
ralists at the global plane. Elitist scholars from the power structure research school
already pointed out that the question is mainly a matter of local and nonlocal elite
organization. Both Mills [1956] and Domhoff [1967] noted that, whereas at the local
level there was room for competition between elites as pointed out in Price and Dahl
[1962], the institutions that transcended the local level were dominated by a small
number of people of a clearly discernible upper class. This suggests a research agenda
where we investigate in depth the characteristics, motives and strategies of the firms,
directors, and perhaps also cities that build the nonlocal elite networks.
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xAppendix A
xCity Level Aggregation
As explained in Section 3.2., we study the network of interlocking directorates
at the level of cities. However, if we simply merge firms from the same city into one
node in order to create a city-by-city network, we run into a number of problems
due to the noise and inconsistencies in the city information. For example, we would
have to deal with spelling variations of city names, e.g., The Hague, the political
capital of the Netherlands, is sometimes written as ’s-Gravenhage. And for example
Brussels, the capital of Belgium, is also written as Bruxelles (French) and sometimes
as Brussel (Dutch). More importantly, small suburban areas close to a larger city may
have a different name, but would by any expert be seen as belonging to the same
metropolitan area. However, due to the sheer amount of information we are not able
to manually correct this.
The aforementioned problems are solved by retrieving for each city its coordi-
nates (latitude and longitude) using the Google Maps API, and then grouping cities
with very similar coordinates into one node which we call a “citycluster.” We used
the well-known and established MeanShift algorithm [Fukunaga and Hostetler 1975]
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as implemented in the sklearn package in Python to cluster the cities. For one out of
ten of the cities, we only had information on the country in which the firm is located,
or we were not able to automatically determine the latitude and longitude, leaving
us no choice but to disregard these firms in our study. The majority (90%) of these
firms with missing location data were however located in Panama, leaving only 1%
missing data for the remainder of the world. Typically, these firms were smaller busi-
nesses in rural areas, having mostly national interlocks, if any. These steps result in
a citycluster-by-citycluster network in which cityclusters are connected by a weight-
ed edge denoting the number of firms that are connected between two clusters. In
some cityclusters we find cities from a border region of two different countries. In
these instances, we split the original citycluster into two cityclusters, each containing
the cities on one side of the border. In the text, we simply refer to cities instead of
cityclusters.
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Where is the Global Corporate Elite?
A Large-scale Network Study of Local and Nonlocal Interlocking
Directorates
Abstract: Business elites reconfigure their locus of organization over time, from the city level,
to the national level, and beyond. We ask what the current level of elite organization is and
propose a novel theoretical and empirical approach to answer this question. Building on the
universal distinction between local and nonlocal ties we use network analysis and community
detection to dissect the global network of interlocking directorates among over five million
firms. We find that elite orientation is indeed changing from the national to the transnational
plane, but we register a considerable heterogeneity across different regions in the world. In some
regions the business communities are organized along national borders, whereas in other areas
the locus of organization is at the city level or international level. London dominates the global
corporate elite network. Our findings underscore that the study of corporate elites requires
an approach that is sensitive to levels of organization that go beyond the confines of nation
states.
Keywords: Corporate Elite; Transnational Elite; Corporate Governance; Business Networks;
Interlocking Directorates; Community Detection; Network Analysis; Network Science.
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